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Public Credit and Taxation, 1692-1774 
Julian GWYN 
Some £2.4 millions were raised by the provincial government of Massachusetts between 1692 
and 1770, almost all of which was recycled within its own economy. While half the colony's revenue 
was raised from personal and estate taxes, much help came from British taxpayers, until in 1764 a 
change in imperial policy put an end to these subsidies. High though wartime and post-war taxes had 
been in the 1750s and 1760s, the per-capita burden never approached the high levels of the years 1702-
1713. By 1774, whatever debts the province had acquired by loans from its people had been repaid. 
1t was the fiscal orthodoxy of successive administrations that occasioned, at least in part, the attacks 
on imperial authorities in the immediate pre-revolution years. There is little to support the view that 
Massachusetts nearly bankrupted itself from war or that its people were beggared by a heavy load of 
taxation. 
Entre les annees 1692 et 1770, le gouvernement provincial du Massachusetts pen;ut La somme 
de 2,4 millions de livres, somme dont La quasi-totalite Jut d' ailleurs injectee dans l' economie colonia/e. 
Beaucoup d'aide venait, par voie de subvention, de payeurs de taxes britanniques. L'application de ce 
schema cessa brusquement en 1764 lorsque, par un revirement de sa politique, le gouvernement britannique 
chercha plutot a trouver des fonds en Amerique. Bien que. les impots aient ete eleves au cours des 
annees 1750 et 1760- annees de guerre et d'apres-guerre-, leur poids par habitant n'atteignit 
jamais celui des annees 1702-1713. Des 1774, La province avait deja remis taus les prets que lui avait 
consentis La population. Ainsi, les attaques pre-revolutionnaires contre les autorites imperiales furent 
occasionnees en partie par l' orthodoxie fiscale dont firent preuve. avec succes, les administrations 
successives. L' opinion qui veut que Laguerre ait pratiquement ruine le Massachusetts au que l' imposition 
par La province ait reduit La population a La mendicite ne repose sur a peu pres rien . 
For any to grumble at the Raising needful 
taxes to defray our pub lick charges, is a piece 
of unreasonable and abominable Baseness; 
and it is a scandal to New-England that ever 
it should be found amongst us . 1 
I 
"No government", wrote the Reverend Joseph B. Felt in 1847, "can exist 
without appropriate supplies, any more than a human body can live without 
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nourishment.'' 2 This is a study of the development in the public finances of 
Massachusetts from the granting of the new charter in 1691 , after the disturb-
ances of the Glorious Revolution, until the eve of the War of Independence, when 
royal authority was so undermined that it was unable even to collect taxes. The 
decade of disturbance leading to war was heralded by a crucial reversal of policy which 
affected Massachusetts profoundly. Until 1764 she had been encouraged by large 
parliamentary grants, shipped into the hands of her treasurer almost annually, to 
play a leading role in the defence of the colonies. Now with the outbreak of peace 
that policy, without consultation by Britain of colonial sentiments, was fatally re-
versed. New imperial fiscal measures, far from making grants to North American 
colonies, sought to tax them for part of the overall defence costs. 
Taxation and governmental expenditure are compelling subjects in all ages, 
and prominent features of political economy. Historically the elite, who have been 
the principal beneficiaries of such public spending, have invariably resented parting 
even with the smallest portions of the gains they have made from the public trough. 
The reality of taxpaying is everywhere unpopular. As an idea it becomes bearable 
only when those who are taxed can determine, however remotely, the amount to 
be collected as well as the direction of public expenditure. In the eighteenth century 
this was not a new idea. Lord Camden in 1766, echoing seventeenth-century com-
mentators as well as the American patriot James Otis, remarked: 
Taxation and representation are inseparable .... whatever is a man's own, is absolutely 
his own; no man hath a right to take itJrom him without his consent, either expressed 
by himself or representative; whoever attempts to do it, attempts an injury; whoever does 
it, commits a robbery; he throws down and destroys the distinction between liberty and 
slavery. 3 
Such ideas, it is well known, became the tinder of the Stamp Act crisis of 1765, 
when so many of the colonial elite became politicized for the first time. 
While so many words have been spilled to explain the nature of the slavery 
Britain sought to impose on America by her taxation measures after 1764, little 
attention has been focused on the system developed by the colonies to tax themselves. 4 
That it was a very light burden in most years, when comparison is made with 
taxation levels in Britain and Ireland, 5 might explain its general neglect by scholars. 
2. Joseph B. FELT, "Statistics of Taxation in Massachusetts, including Valuation and Population", 
Collections of the American Statistical Association, I (1847): 221. 
3. Speech of Lord Camden on the American Declaratory Bill in he House of Lords, 7 March 
1766, in The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, 36 vol. 
(London, 1813, reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966), XVI: 178. 
4. The exceptions are Lawrence Henry GIPSON, "Connecticut Taxation and Parliamentary 
Aid Preceding the Revolutionary War", American Historical Review, XXXVI (July 1931): 721-39; 
Marvin L. KAY, "Provincial Taxes in North Carolina During the Administrations of Dobbs and Tyron", 
North Carolina Historical Review, XLII (Autumn 1965): 440-53, and "The Payment of Provincial and 
Local Taxes in North Carolina, 1748-1771", William and Mary Quarterly, ser. 3, XXVI (Apri11969): 
218-40; Robert A. BECKER, Revolution, Reform and the Politics of American Taxation, 1763-1783 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 1980). On New England up to 1775, see esp. pp. 8-41. 
5. The tax burden in Massachussetts, for instance, is throught to have been in 1765 about 
4 percent that of Britain and about 15 percent that of Ireland. See Gary M. WALTON and James SHEPHERD. 
The Economic Rise of Early America (Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 163-64. 
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Nevertheless, in view of the central importance of taxation in the rhetoric of the 
revolutionary movement, especially among the social and political elite, it is a 
subject that deserves fuller articulation. 6 
Recent work by New England historians relating to this question has centred 
principally on Boston. This had tended to give the impression that the town's 
experience was representative of all of Massachusetts or even of New England as 
a whole. Nothing could be more inaccurate. That Boston was highly taxed in relation 
to the rest of the province, as was asserted by eighteenth-century selectmen, has 
been amply demonstrated by Nash. 7 The general economic stagnation of the town 
at times during the 1730s, 1740s and 1750s, in such vivid contrast to the expansion 
and optimism of New York and Philadelphia, resulted in growing urban poverty, 
increasing tax arrears, an absolute decline in the number of Boston's taxpayers, 
and the concentration of more of the town's wealth in fewer hands. This too has 
been convincingly argued by some recent historians. 8 It is quite another thing to 
claim that war taxation in Massachusetts discouraged trade and so influenced the 
economic well-being of the colony that "beginning in the 1730s" 9 men chose to 
emigrate rather than pay such taxes. 
To ascribe to wartime taxes the relative poverty of white males in New England 
in the 1770s, as compared to those of the Middle Colonies or the South, without 
taking into account the relative distribution of natural resources, differences in 
climate, and ultimately the market needs of the Atlantic economy in the 1760s and 
1770s, is to invite serious criticism. 10 Pencak believes that Massachusetts nearly 
bankrupted itself by its expenditure on war. 11 Yet bankruptcy was never a possibility 
after 1750, while earlier the printing of paper money and the rapid increase of taxes 
in wartime ensured that insolvency as a serious possibility never arose. Certainly 
6. The annual financial statements of the government of The Massachusetts Bay, upon which 
this article principally rests, are found in two locations : Massachusetts Archives, State House, Boston, 
vol. 1?2-25 , and the Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO),C05/852-54. A few of the annual 
reports have not survived, and in such cases, where possible, data have been drawn from The Acts and 
Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of The Massachusetts Bay , eds. Albert C. GOODELL et 
al., 20 vol. (Boston, 1896-1918). 
7. Gary B. NASH, The Urban Crucible : Social Change, Public Consciousness, and the Origins 
of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), Table 11, p. 403, provides 
useful data on per capita annual tax for the town of Boston, expressed in sterling. For 1695-1714 it 
averaged less than 8s; for 1715-39 it fell by half to less than 4s. Between 1740 and 1764 it rose to 
slightly more than lOs. On the eve of the Revolutionary War between 1770 and 1774 it had declined 
to less than 9s. 
8. Ibid.' p. 117, 182-84, 252-54. 
9. William PENCAK, War, Politics and Revolution in Provincial Massachusetts (Boston : North-
western University Press, 1981), p. 94-95 . 
10. Ibid., p. 237 : " Per capita net worth for white males, £131 sterling in the southern colonies, 
£51 in the middle, averaged only £32 in New England. Much of this relative poverty can be traced to 
war taxation, the neglect of agriculture and trade with so many men in the army, and additional blows 
to the Boston economy from impressment and the extremely heavy taxes laid by the province on the 
capital." 
II. Ibid. p. 237: "For a quarter of a century, Massachusetts waged total war. In so doing, 
the Bay Colony nearly bankrupted itself." 
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there is very little evidence that it was a matter of public discussion. More convincingly, 
Nash writes of a general sense of economic crisis in Boston, especially in the 1750s 
and 1760s. This he ascribes to heavy taxation, trade restrictions and the strict 
enforcement of custom regulations. 12 Certainly such complaints were voiced loudly; 
and important political points were made by those opposed to the executive power 
in Massachusetts. Yet from his own evidence it is clear that in the early 1770s, 
when the revolutionary movement acquired new impetus, the economy was displaying 
definite signs of recovery. At a time when taxes were falling, and budgets were 
balanced, patriots had to look elsewhere than to the economic sphere to draw 
inspiration for their attack upon the executive. 
This study serves as a corrective to recent work on New England and its 
principal focus on the town of Boston. A consideration of the fiscal history of 
Massachusetts as a whole will place Boston's peculiar problems in a wider perspective. 
Before the details of the colony's public finance and taxation are addressed, something 
brief should be said about the development of Massachusetts in the eighteenth 
century. 
II 
In the years between the Glorious Revolution and the overthrow of the gov-
ernment of the Dominion of New England and the violence of the Boston Tea 
Party, Lexington and Bunker Hill, Massachusetts underwent remarkable changes. 
Her population grew more than five times from less than 50,000 to more than 
265,000, and without benefit of significant immigration. Wealth, principally in the 
form of land, became increasingly concentrated in fewer hands. The structure of 
the economy, though based on subsistence agriculture, became increasingly diversified 
upon the pillars of overseas commerce and the related industries of shipbuilding, 
iron manufacture, sugar refining and rum distilling. Fisheries, principally in cod, 
remained an important market for ships and men, as well as a vital source of foreign 
earnings. Lacking a staple, such as furs, tobacco or sugar, her rapacious merchants 
competed furiously with the English and other Americans for markets and for a 
share of shipping. Yet the supremacy of Massachusetts in America, so clear in the 
seventeenth century, vanished; and by the 1730s she was being steadily overtaken 
by New York and Pennsylvania, Virginia and even South Carolina. Per capita 
wealth grew · though less rapidly than elsewhere in America, and far less rapidly 
than in the South. 
Political life, between 1691 and 1774, forms a single piece, with three distinct 
phases. The first, lasting untill713, was characterized by war as politicians learned 
to live under the new charter, which granted them a succession of royal governors. 
The second phase, between 1713 and 1744, was devoted to "localism, ideological 
wrangling, stalemate, and stagnation" with the General Court (Council and House 
of Representatives) ''settling disputes that became too hot to handle on the town 
level, determining the ownership of frontier lands, granting licences to sell liquor, 
12. NASH, Urban Crucible, p. 337. 
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and voting an annual budget.'' 13 Upon the outbreak of the war first with Spain in 
1739 and then with France in 1744, colonial Massachusetts entered the final phase 
of her political life, a generation of war and its dislocating aftermath. 
War greatly increased the role of government .. . the legislature no longer spent most of 
its time reacting to petitions from the towns and inhabitants and then settling disputes . 
Beginning in the 1740s and 1750s, deputies from throughout the province ... initiated 
and shaped government policy instead of merely voting on issues laid before them by 
the leadership.•• 
Year after year they approved war budgets, requisitioned supplies, placed embargoes 
on trade and provisions. If the towns were dominant before the 1740s, the provincial 
govenunent emerged as the main political force for the generation before the American 
revolution. 
The importance of war to Massachusetts' society, economy and politics should 
not be underestimated. A history of brutal Indian warfare in the seventeenth century 
gave way after 1688 to greater anxiety about the power of France, which only the 
conquest of Canada removed. Between 1688 and 1713 Massachusetts found herself 
not only unable to protect her own frontiers, but fearing, if not actually enduring, 
attack from a French seaborne invasion force. The colony depended absolutely on 
the power of England to sustain her, being able to deal with the real or imagined 
French threat in Acadia or at Louisbourg only with British naval support. Not until 
a British army was based at Albany in the 1750s could the province rest secure 
from French attacks on the western frontier. Rebellion against Britain, while France 
remained powerful in America, would have been unthinkable. 
III 
Normally eighteenth-century govenunents paid for the rapid increases in public 
spending necessitated by war, by both increasing taxation and developing a system 
of public borrowing. England after 1688 was the best example of successful creation 
of such a system, institutionalized as the National Debt, while France, a country 
of far greater population and wealth, was the classic case of fiscal failure which 
led directly to the collapse of the monarchy. Most other leading states-Russia, 
Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Spain and Portugal-lay somewhere between the two 
extremes. Though a colony, Massachusetts ought to be treated, for matters of public 
finance , as if it were nominally a separate state, at least as independent in financial 
matters as the German states of Hesse-Kassel whom British taxpayers, through 
parliamentary subsidies, were called upon to support from time to time, in peace 
as in war, during the century. 
Given the province's relative poverty and lack of bureaucracy throughout its 
colonial history, it would have been impossible to pay for her war efforts merely 
by increasing direct and indirect taxes to meet the costs of war. Already the men 
of Massachusetts believed town taxes were high enough, and indeed they were 
13. William PFNCAK, "Warfare and Political Change in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts", 
in The British Atlantic Empire before the American Revolution, eds. Peter MARSHALL and Glyn WILUAMS 
(London : Frank Cass, 1980), p. 53 . 
14. Ibid., p. 69. 
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usually higher than those collected for the province. What was open to them when 
war broke out with France in 1689, and when they decided upon an ambitious 
imperial policy to drive the French out of Acadia and Quebec, was to develop an 
adequate means of financing such enterprises in order to ensure that the burden 
would not be excessive. It would have been folly to allow costs to outstrip the 
benefits. There were several possibilities open to the General Court, and by 1774 
they had tried most of these. They could act like speculators and hope that plunder 
taken from the enemy would be sufficient to meet costs, and reward the troops and 
seamen with grants of land seized from the defeated enemy. This inspired their 
attack on Quebec in 1680 and Louisbourg in 1745. Hopes in both cases proved ill-
founded, for in the first instance they failed to take Quebec, and in the second 
though the fortress fell, the subsequent treaty guaranteed the French all their moveable 
possessions. They pursued currency inflation as their principal solution to public 
expenditures which could not be answered by taxes or the sale of land. This was, 
except in the short-run, self-defeating. They were in no position, nor were they 
tempted, to write off their accumulated debts. Finally, from 1750 onwards, they 
developed a more than adequate system of public debt, which enabled them to 
compensate for the inadequacies of their own taxation system and to maintain taxes 
at a level lower than would otherwise have been possible. Undoubtedly this enabled 
Massachusetts to spend on war a great deal more than she could have done had 
taxes been the sole source of her revenue. Though it cannot be shown to have been 
strategically decisive in any campaign between 1690 and 1763, it doubtless enabled 
her to play a larger role in the military and naval affairs of North America, as 
measured by her population size, than any other of the American colonies. Finally 
she was greatly helped by direct subsidies received from Britain. 15 Without such 
compensation for her war effort, Massachusetts would have been able to play her 
imperial role only with acute hardship to her people on a scale even greater than 
they actually complained of. 
After 1690 and until 1750 Massachusetts tried a number of expedients, other 
than launching a scheme of long-term public borrowing. When the 1690 expeditionary 
force returned from Quebec empty-handed but with many bills payable, the costs 
were borne by the public treasury . So-called bills of credit were issued for soldiers' 
and seamens' pay and to meet the costs of the outfitters. These not only were used 
to pay taxes, local and provincial, but quickly became part of the New England 
money stock in commercial transactions. The confusion between the treasury's role 
as a central bank concerned with the money supply and its function as a public 
office responsible for government debts bedevilled the prospects for the 'Success of 
this policy. The bills of credit, or paper money, were new to America. They were 
at first secured against futute tax revenue, by taxes being laid in sufficient amounts 
over a number of years in order to redeem the paper credit. Their value was rated 
according to either the sterling price of an ounce of silver or the sterling value of 
a Spanish piece of eight (known also as a peso, or more commonly, a dollar) . At 
least until 1710 the emissions of this paper were suitably modest . The influx of 
silver specie was sufficient from trade visible or invisible, so that bills of credit 
15. Gross sums for the 1745-46 Louisbourg expedition and occupation amounted to £183 ,649, 
and for the 1746-47 planned expedition to conquer Canada, £87,435 . Journals of the House of Commons, 
(London, 1803), 25: 568-69, 1042-46. 
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retained their value. Taxes also remained high, and though the bills of credit were 
not all redeemed as had originally been intended, public confidence, the real measure 
of a successful undertaking of this sort, remained strong. 
Such confidence began to be undermined from 1711 when public finance 
policy was significantly altered. To help outfit what proved to be another abortive 
attempt to conquer Quebec, a loan of M£50,000 (about £33,350) was made by the 
public treasury to the merchant outfitters, mainly of Boston. This was secured on 
the value of bills of exchange they had accumulated in their hands, drawn ultimately 
on the treasury in London, to meet the demands of British military and naval forces 
then preparing to sail for Quebec. 16 Initially the scheme which involved simply 
printing new bills of credit, again acceptable for the payment of taxes, seemed to 
succeed. Unfortunately many of the bills of exchange were disputed in London, 
and payment of such bills receivable were at best slow and frequently a fiction . 
Much less sound was the plan to establish a public land bank in 1714. Under 
this scheme Massachusetts made four loans: in 1714 for M£50,000 (£32,600), in 
1716 for M£100,000 (£61,540), in 1721 for M£50,000 (£22,800) and in 1728 for 
M£60,000 (£17,910)_17 The General Court issued bills of credit secured on land 
mortgages. Interest was to be paid annually by those who availed themselves of 
the plan along with a fixed portion of the principal. The 1714 loan was amortized 
over five years at 5 percent and the 1716 over ten years. Those of 1721 and 1728 
were divided among the towns of Massachusetts in proportion to their assessments 
for provincial tax. The towns undertook to determine the distribution and size of 
loans within their jurisdictions. They collected both interest and principal with the 
right to retain the principal for their local needs. The 1721 loan was to be retired 
in annual instalments between 1726 and 1730, and the 1728 loan in six equal 
instalments between 1734 and 1739. From the provincial treasurer's viewpoint, the 
1714 and 1716loans made sense by reason of the revenue they generated in addition 
to that coming from the normal annual tax load. The 1721 and 1728 loans made 
less sense as the revenue generated promised to be less. 
One of the effects of this policy was to undermine the value of the currency 
circulating, partly by excessive emissions, partly by the infusion of too many Rhode 
Island bills of credit, 18 but principally by an adverse balance of payments in most 
years from 1720s through the late 17 40s which meant that too little silver specie 
was retained in the province. Between the end of the war in 1713 and the end of 
the war in 1749, the exchange rate between Massachusetts paper and sterling 
16. Curtis P. NEITELS, The Money Supply of the American Colonies before 1720 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1934), p. 196. 
17. Leslie V. BROCK, The Currency of the American Colonies 1700-1764: A Study in Colonial 
Finance and Imperial Relations (New York : Kelley, 1975), pp. 23-28. 
18. J.M. MAciNNIS, "Rhode Island Bills of Credit, 1710-1755" (PhD dissertation, Brown 
University, 1952), pp. 72-82, 588-90, 599-600. Between 1711 and 1751 Rhode Island emitted some 
£1.3 million in bills of credit. By 1741 this amounted to half the New England total, though Rhode 
Island had only 10 percent of New England's population. In per capita terms, Rhode Island had bills 
of credit still outstanding in 1740 amounting to £16.5, while Massachusetts had but £3.8. As such 
Rhode Island bills, as well as those of Connecticut and New Hampshire, were exchanged at face value 
in Massachusetts, the value of all New England currencies, including that of Massachusetts, tended to 
be undermined by the too active printing press in Rhode Island. See Julian GWYN, "War and Economic 
Change: Louisbourg and the New England Economy in the 1740s", University of Ottawa Review, 47 
(January-April 1977): 119. 
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changed dramatically from about M£150 for £100 in 1713, to M£500 in 1736, and 
by 1749 to between M£1,000 and M£1,150. 19 In paper money terms commodity 
prices rose dramatically. A bushel of wheat rose from a 1720-2 average of 1s. 2d. 
to a 1747-9 average of 43s. Though in sterling equivalents this meant that the price 
of wheat remained virtually unchanged, in Massachusetts currency the rise was 
sixfold. A gallon of molasses between 1720-2 and 1747-9 rose on average more 
than eight times, while in sterling terms it only slightly more than doubled. 20 Dr. 
William Douglass, a controversial yet acute contemporary critic, observed the 
impact on wages, fees, salaries or pensions. Money values might rise but real wages 
and salaries fell. Particularly hurt also, as always when the rate of inflation exceeds 
the rate of interest, were creditors. 21 Only highly favoured, exceptionally enterprising, 
or very fortunate individuals were able to ride the inflationary storm. The treasurers 
of Massachusetts, doubtless some of the most exacting, honest and hardworking 
men in the province, were one such example. Yet even they were not immune to 
the ravages of currency inflation, as Table 1 illustrates: 
Table 1 
Fiscal year 
1696-97 
1717-18 
1733-34 
1740-41 
1748-49 
Value of Provincial Treasurer's Salary, 
Massachusetts, 1696-1749 
Salary in 
Massachusetts 
Currency (M£) 
250 
250 
350 
420 
1,400 
Source : Massachusetts Archives, State House, Boston, vol. 122-24. 
Salary in 
Pounds 
Sterling (£) 
183.75 
147.00 
100.10 
77.70 
147.00 
As measured in sterling, the treasurer in the 1740s was not as well off as he had 
been in the 1690s. By 1748-9 his salary regained its sterling value of 1717-8, though 
still 20 percent below the 1690s, yet only when it had been increased in terms of 
Massachusetts currency by 460 percent. For those less well-placed than the treasurers 
the loss in value of the provincial bill of credit was an almost unavoidable burden, 
and an indirect tax which was extracted from them against their will, but which 
they were powerless to alter. 
Protest they could; and the whole method of financing public expenditure 
became a matter of serious controversy both within the General Court and outside. 
Something of a pamphlet warfare ensued, which produced little wisdom, whether 
19. Most references to the exchange rate are taken from John J. McCuSKER, Money and 
Exchange in Europe and America, /6()()-1775 : A Handbook (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina 
Press, 1978). Table 3.1, pp. 139-42. 
20. Prices calculated from Ruth CRANDALL, "Wholesale Commodity Prices at Boston, 1700-
1795", in Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States. 1700-1861, ed. Arthur Harrison COLE 
(Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 117. 
21. Dr. William DouGLASS, A Discourse Concerning the Currencies of the British Plantations 
in America especially with regard to their Paper Money with a Postscript thereto (London, 1739; 
Boston, 1740; London, 1751), in A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts and Other Publications 
on Paper Currency and Banking, ed. John R. McCULLOCH (London, 1857), pp. 19-21. 
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the authors supported a paper money policy or a return to specie payments or hard 
money. The controversy threw up no Adam Smith or David Ricardo. Instead there 
was an air of anxious acceptance and resignation, immortalized in the words of the 
Reverend John Wise: 
How shall we keep up the Value of our Bills of Publick Credit? ... You must do by 
your Bills, as all Wise Men do by their Wives; Make the best of them. It is an acknowledged 
Theorem, that there is no doing without Wives. Lonesome and sower Phylosopher would 
frankly confess, that Women, were necessary Evils ; For without their Assistance the 
whole Human Race must vanish ; And unless they are metamorphised into things called 
Wives, the whole Species would soon laps into a heard of Brutified Animals. The great 
Skill is to cultivate the necessity and make it a Happiness; for that end, Wise Men Love 
their Wives; and what ill-conveniences they find in them they bury; and what Vertues 
they are inrich't with they Admire and Magnifie. 22 
His ignorance of women was as great as his unhelpfulness in matters of money. 
He was not alone; for even the celebrated Dr. Douglass could suggest nothing more 
than more moderation in emitting bills of credit, without considering the needs of 
the colony's economy, and more exactitude in laying taxes to withdraw them 
regularly from circulation. 23 Like all his contemporaries he remained ignorant of 
the impact of the adverse balance of payments. 
The government was caught in a situation which, whatever its critics believed, 
was only partly its own making. To blame paper credit as the cause of the recession 
and inflation was absurd. There was an important economic link between the quantity 
of money of all sorts in circulation, the movement of commodity and land prices, 
shifts in the terms of trade and the movement in exchange rates. Much later Henry 
Thornton, the governor of the Bank of England, described the great confusion 
caused the public finance by William Pitt's wartime expenditures against France in 
the 1790s, which obliged the Bank of England to suspend specie payments in 1797. 
Though he was not thinking of the Massachusetts experience, he was perhaps one 
of the first economists to point out that the quantity of paper credit available need 
not tend to raise commodity prices. He considered that it was far more convenient 
than coin, which had to be weighed, counted, insured and transported. Though he 
was perfectly aware of the excessive printing of paper money both during the 
American War of Independence and under the French Revolution, from the example 
of England, he was able to argue that "during the period in which our paper has 
extended itself, our trade has prospered, the state of our agriculture has advanced, 
and both the capital and income of the country have been augmented. " 24 If one 
considers the whole of the economic history of Massachusetts from 1690 to 177 5, 
and despite serious short-terin setbacks, the same statement could apply to the 
colony. 
22. Rev. John WISE, in Colonial Currency Reprints, 1685-1751, 4 vol . , ed. Andrew McFarland 
DAVIS (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1910), I: 159-223. 
23. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
24. Henry THORNTON, An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great 
Britain (London, 1802), in McCULLOCH, Paper Currency and Banking, p. 337. Thornton's main position 
is summarized in J.K. HORSFIELD, "The Duties of a Banker: The Effects of Inconvertibility", in Papers 
in English Monetary History, eds. T.S. ASJITON and R.S. SAYERS (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1953), 
pp. 24-29. 
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IV 
From this general consideration let us now tum to the details of the public 
finance of Massachusetts. Between 1692 and 1770 about £2.4 million were collected 
by the various provincial treasurers , or an annual average of more than £30,000. 
Larger by far than the business carried on by all but perhaps a handful of New 
England merchant partnerships, it constituted the principal financial activity of the 
province. 
Revenue came principally, not from borrowing but from taxes on polls (equal 
taxes paid by adult men regardless of their assets or income) and estates, real and 
personal, regularly and frequently reassessed. In addition there were a variety of 
provincial taxes on trade, known by different names at different times: tonnage, 
imposts, excise, and lighthouse duties. Miscellaneous revenue was raised also by 
fines, occasionally by profits from publicly financed trade with the Indians, and by 
the sale of land. All these were relatively unimportant compared to the revenue 
raised in the 1720s and 1730s by lending money on mortgages and from the 
repayment of principal. They were insignificant also when compared with the British 
parliamentary grants, between 1749 and 1763, for wartime costs borne by Mas-
sachusetts, when undertaken at the specific request of the ministry at home. From 
Table 2 we can see that taxes between 1692 and 1720 were of much greater 
importance to overall public revenue than was the case from the 1720s to the eve 
of the American revolution. 
Table 2 Main Sources of Public Revenue, Massachusetts, 
1692-1770 (in £ sterling) 
Excise- Per capita 
Fiscal years* Taxes laid impost Other Totals per annum 
£ % £ % £ % £ £ 
1692-3/ 1699-1700 62,540 64.0 27,340 28.0 7,840 8.0 97,720 .23 
1700-1/1709-10 122,280 83.3 19,530 13.3 4,910 3.4 146,720 .25 
1710-1/1719-20 97,510 60.3 31,180 19.3 33,030 20.4 161,720 .21 
1720-111729-30 56,710 50.4 25,310 22.5 30,570 27.1 112,590 .11 
1730-111739-40 51,760 56.0 20,290 22.0 20,360 22.0 92,410 .o7 
1740-111749-50 192,640 46.5 34,400 8.3 187,220 45.2 414,260 .24 
1750-1/1759-60 330,450 57.4 68,640 11.9 176,850 30.7 575,940 .28 
1760-111769-70 390,340 50.5 106,350 13.8 275,510 35.7 772,200 .32 
Totals 1,304,230 55.0 333,040 14.0 736,290 31.0 2,373,560 .21 
Sources : Massachusetts Archives, vol. 122-25; Public Records Office, Kew (hereafter PRO), 
C05/852-54. 
*Beginning of first and end of last fiscal year in each period; thus 1692-1700 = fiscal years 1692-93 
through 1699-1700. 
For the entire period such taxes generated about 55 percent of revenue. It was 
during Queen Anne's war that taxes were of greatest importance, when more than 
83 percent of revenue came from this source. Still, owing to the almost continuous 
wars or threats of hostilities during the 17 40s, 17 50s and until 17 63, far greater 
revenue was generated annually than earlier. When measured by population it was 
in the first decade of the eighteenth century that the burden was largest. It reached 
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on average 4s. 2 Yzd. per head of population per year. It was lowest in the 1730s 
when it fell to 9Yzd. per head (Table 3). 
Table 3 Burden of Taxes on PoDs and Estates, Massachusetts, 
1692-1770 (£ sterling per capita) 
Fiscal years* 
1692-3/1699-1700 
1700-1/ 1709-10 
1710-1/1719-20 
1720-1/ 1729-30 
1730-1/1739-40 
1740-1/1749-50 
1750-1/1759-60 
1760-1/1767-70 
£ 
0.15 
0.21 
0.12 
0.06 
0.04 
0.11 
0.17 
0.18 
Sources: Massachusetts Archives, vol. 122-25; PRO, C05/852-55 . 
£.s.d. 
3s. 0 d. 
4s. 21/ul. 
2s. 4'14ll. 
Is. 21/ul. 
9Vu1. 
2s. 2Vu1. 
3s. 43/4ll. 
3s. 7Y4ll. 
*Beginning of first and end of last fiscal year in each period; thus 1692-1700 = fiscal years 1692-93 
through 1699-1700. 
Were such taxes a heavy burden? Clearly contemporaries thought so; and this 
view has been echoed, as we have seen, by some historians. Apart from Boston's 
special situation evidence for general economic distress such as from bankruptcies 
is unsatisfactory. A better indication of the relative burden of taxes, and the taxpayers' 
ability to meet payment can be found by comparing levels of unpaid taxes at various 
times between 1690 and 1770. As taxes tended to rise steeply in wartime, we would 
expect the level of unpaid taxes to be higher a year or two after the war than a year 
or two before it had broken out. Table 4 does not confirm these expectations. 
Table 4 Levels of Taxes and Loans Outstanding, Massachusetts, 
1698-1770 (in£ sterling) 
Per capita burden 
Fiscal year Unpaid taxes and loans 
£ £ £.s.d. 
1698-9 3,419 . 06 Is. 2V2d . 
1716-7 3,448 .05 Is. 
1737-8 17,686 . 12 2s. 4%d . 
1750-1 13,335 .07 Is. 6 d. 
1763-4 53,283 .26 5s. 2'12d. 
1769-70 51,066 . 19 3s. 9 112d . 
Sources: Massachusetts Archives, vol. 122-25; PRO, C05/852-55. 
Despite the costs of the war of 1702-1713, the level of unpaid taxes actually declined 
when measured by population. By constrast, despite the following two decades of 
peace and low public spending, unpaid debts, which included tax arrears, rose more 
than five times. The explanation is to be found in the various mortgages taken up 
by Massachusetts' landowners between 1714 and 1728. The situation had again 
reversed itself by 1750-51 when after a decade of war both the absolute sum of 
unpaid taxes and loans declined, and the per capita burden almost reached the level 
of the late 1690s. The explanation here is to be found partly in the fact that there 
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was no provincial tax in two fiscal years: 1739-40 or 1750-51. By the end of the 
French and Indian war in 1736, the level of unpaid taxes had risen by 400 percent, 
though the per capita burden was actually less. Yet even at that level the burden 
of unpaid taxes was only 5s. 2Y2d.! With budgets in the post-war era characterized 
by high taxes, the rate of outstanding taxes gradually declined, and the per capita 
burden fell significantly. This occurred despite the fact that four towns-Enfield, 
Somers, Woodstock and Suffield-had, in the words of Treasurer Harrison Gray, 
"revolted to the Connecti~ut Government" 25 , leaving provincial debts of £14,355 
by May 1769. Yet by the fiscal year 1773-74, the overall provincial debt of Mas-
sachusetts had been almost entirely cleared. 
Taxes on trade and shipping generated about 14 percent of gross provincial 
revenues between 1692 and 1770. The lowest yields occurred in years of war, with 
the disruption of trade generally and the collapse of exports in particular. The one 
exception, as yet unexplained, was the period of war in the 1690s, when fully 
28 percent of public revenue was generated from such sources. During Queen Anne's 
war which followed the yield was more than halved. Peace after 1713 brought a 
revival of trade and a consequent rise in the proportion of public revenue generated 
by imposts and excises. The same pattern took place in the war years of the 1740s, 
1750s and until 1763. Thereafter, though the revenue from taxes on trade reached 
an average of more than £10,000 annually, or three times what it had been in the 
1690s, still at 13.7 percent of all revenues it fell below the average for the entire 
period under study. 
The principal new source of public revenue in the eighteenth century, which 
by the 1720s had overtaken trade taxes in importance, and by the 1740s rivalled 
taxes on polls and estates, was twofold: income from principal and interest on 
mortgages on land in the 1720s and 1730s, and from parliamentary grants from 
1749 onwards until the middle 1760s. Massachusetts, for her efforts in taking 
Louisbourg and forming the garrison there in the winter of 1745-46, as well as for 
her preparations for the abortive attack on Canada in 1746-47, was granted by 
Parliament the gross sum of about £271,000, of which all but about£ 10,000 reached 
her coffers between 1748 and 1751. 26 Curiously none of these well-documented 
transfer payments was noted in the official ledgers by the treasurer. During the 
French and Indian war and afterwards another £352,000 in parliamentary grants, 
which after various fees and transportation costs were deducted left a little more 
than £332,000 for the Massachusetts treasury, were received by the treasurer Harrison 
GrayY In all, such miscellaneous revenue averaged almost 31 percent of gross 
public revenue, though it ranged from a low of 5.4 percent during Queen Anne's 
war, before the policy of parliamentary grants had been instituted, to a high of 
45 percent in the 17 40s, owing to the influx of parliamentary money. 
From the revenue side of the ledger we must now turn to that of expenditures. 
Though successive treasurers made little attempt, before the advent of William Foye 
(treasurer from 1736 to 1753), to group expenditures under various headings, it 
25. PRO, C05/854, fol. 164, 183, 199, 213v. 
26. See n. 15 above for details. 
27. Jack P. GREEN, ''The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution: The Causal Relationship 
Reconsidered", in MARSHALL and WILLIAMS, British Atlantic Empire, p. 98. The total granted to the 
colonies by way of reimbursement came to about £1 .1 million. 
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clearly divided itself into two categories: for the military and naval on the one 
hand, and for civil matters on the other. Later, from the 1750s onward, there was 
a new item for the interest payments made to the government' s creditors. It is 
evident from Table 5 that public expenditure was principally for defence or for 
active campaigning. 
Table 5 Public Expenditure of Massachusetts, 
1692-1770 (in £sterling) 
Per capita 
Fiscal years* Military-naval Civil Interest Totals per annum 
£ % £ % £ % £ £ 
1692-3/1699-1700 95,600 81.6 21 ,570 18.4 117,170 .28 
1700-111709-10 178,990 90.5 18,880 9 .5 197,870 .33 
1710-111719-20 117,490 79.6 30,060 20.4 147,550 .19 
1720-111729-30 96,320 75.9 30,590 24.1 126,910 .12 
1730-111739-40 41 ,910 43.4 54,670 56.6 96,580 .07 
1740-111749-50 420,200 87.9 57,710 12.1 477,910 .28 
1750-1/1759-60 618,970 85.8 75,870 10.5 26,790 3 .7 721,630 .35 
1760-1/1769-70 345,640 60.8 92,040 16.2 130,970 23 .0 568 ,650 .23 
Totals 1,915,120 78.1 381,390 15.5 157,760 6.4 2 ,454,270 
Sources : Massachusetts Archives , vol. 122-25; PRO, C05/852-55 . 
*Beginning of first and end of last fiscal year in each period; thus 1692-1700 = fiscal years 1692-93 
through 1699-1700. 
Even in years of peace, civil expenditures rarely overtook those on the military and 
naval forces, while in wartime total expenditure on the military almost invariably 
accounted for 85 percent of all provincial public expenditures. This was the case 
in Queen Anne's war from 1703 through 1713, during the next war from 1744 
.through 1748, except in one year: 1747-48, when military expenditure absorbed 
83 percent of the budget, and finally during the French and Indian war, from May 
1755 through May 1763, when again military expenditure was consistently above 
85 percent. The peak year was reached during the Indian war of 1724-25, when 
military costs took up fully 98 percent of all public expenditure in Massachusetts. 
Only in years of profound peace, such as between 1714 and 1720, and between 
1728 and 1739, did the proportion of military spending dip consistently below civil 
costs. In 1731-32, only one-fifth of total expenditures went to the military, while 
for the period 1728-39 on average only 43 percent was spent on the military, which 
in these years of low budgets meant about £3,900 annually. In Massachusetts, as 
in Britain, the outbreak of war meant a five-fold increase in overall budget: £478,000 
in the 1740s compared with £97,000 in the 1730s. 
Who benefitted from all this public spending? Tax collection and government 
spending, as always, favoured those who were at the top of the economic pyramid. 
In Massachusetts this meant the principal officials and their friends, who invariably 
were among the more substantial families in the province, and who incidentally 
also paid the highest taxes. The first group included those whose salaries were paid 
by the province: the governor, the lieutenant governor who acted as the commander 
of the garrison of Castle William, the treasurer and his deputy , when he had one, 
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the secretary and his assistant, the chief justice and the judges of the superior court, 
the clerk, messenger and doorkeeper of the House of Representatives, as well as 
the speaker. 28 In war there was also a commissary general, a commissioner of 
imprests and a secretary of war. Frequently, though not continuously, there was 
an agent in England to represent the province's interest before the government of 
Parliament. The president of Harvard College and several of his professors-in the 
schools of divinity, natural philosophy, mathematics, Hebrew and other oriental 
languages-were salaried, as were the keepers of the Boston lighthouse, the Charles-
town poor house, the Boston prison and the Rainsford Island hospital. The largest 
amounts in the civil branch went to members of the General Court, who received 
a daily rate for their attendance. The bulk of the military and naval spending went 
for the pay and subsistence of officers and men, paid to their company commanders, 
or to the officers and seamen on board a succession of provincial frigates maintained 
by Massachusetts either to protect her coasts or to convoy troops to the Maine 
frontier, the Bay of Fundy or Cape Breton. 
In addition there was a great variety of other regular or occasional payments. 
As in many American colonies, annual bounties were paid for killing wolves and 
other predators, and in wartime for Indian scalps, which by the 1750s fetched 
M£300 (£225) each. (Few claimed the reward!) Bounties were paid in the 1730s 
for the production of hemp and flax, and in the 1760s for wheat and flour. Those 
who carried the General Court's commissions to neighbouring governments, such 
as to Connecticut to negotiate the endemic dispute over the boundary line, or to 
Canada to repatriate captives, had their expenses paid. Those who suffered by war 
service, usually the disabled, received tiny pensions on occasion. A miscellaneous 
body of payments were made for the support of the poor, especially to the Boston 
poor house, and those for whom no town would take responsibility. In most years 
as much was spent on paper, quills, ink and printing as on the poor. Those who 
cared for the Acadians, unceremoniously dumped on Massachusetts following their 
deportation, received between 1755 and 1767 a total of M£11,374 (£8,350) from 
the province. 29 In particular instances, compensation was paid, as in 1712, when 
M£579 (£386) was paid "for Damages Sustained by Sundry Persons prosecuted 
for Witchcraft in ye year 1692. '' 30 The town of Boston received several grants after 
the great fire of 1760, while Governor Thomas Hutchinson and Benjamin Hallowell, 
whose homes and effects had been ransacked by the Boston mob during the Stamp 
Act riots received compensation from the taxpayers of Massachusetts, one for 
M£3,915 (£2,936), the other for M£1,805 (£1,345). The Assembly also compensated 
those who claimed their bills of credit had been destroyed in house fires. 
That the General Court was so indulgent of some of the less fortunate holders 
of its paper money was perhaps no more than a clever act of public relations. For 
the gap between revenue and expenditure, so great especially in wartime, could be 
filled only by public confidence and self-sacrifice, by a willingness to lend the 
28. This casts doubt on the assertion that Massachusetts "employed six fulltime public officials". 
Robert ZEMSKY, Merchants, Farmers and River Gods: An Essay in Eighteenth Century American Politics 
(Boston: Gambit, 1970), p. 2. 
29. Not £10,000 as stated by R.G. LoWE, "Massachusetts and the Acadians", William and 
Mary Quarterly, 3d ser. XXV (April 1968) : 221. 
30. Massachusetts Archives, vol. 122, p. 398. 
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government money. The need for such public indulgence is seen in Table 6 which 
presents the details of the balance between revenue and expenditure during the 
seventy-eight years covered in this study. 
Table 6 
Fiscal years* 
1692-3/1699-1700 
1700-l/1709-10 
1710-l/1719-20 
1720-l/ 1729-30 
1730-l/1739-40 
1740-1/1749-50 
1750-1/1759-60 
1760-l/1769-70 
Totals : 
Net Balance 
Expenditure and Revenue in Massachusetts, 
1692-1770 (in £ sterling) 
Expenditure 
£ 
ll7,170 
197,870 
147,550 
136,910 
96,580 
477,910 
721,630 
568,650 
2,464,270 
Revenue 
£ 
97,720 
146,780 
161 ,720 
112,590 
92,410 
414,260 
575,940 
772,200 
2,373,620 
Sources: Massachusetts Archives, vol. 122-25; PRO, C05/852-55 . 
Surplus 
£ 
14,170 
203,550 
217,720 
Deficit 
£ 
(19,450) 
(51,090) 
(24,320) 
( 4,170) 
(63,650) 
(145,690) 
(308,370) 
(90,650) 
*Beginning of first and end of last fiscal year in each period; thus 1692-1700 = fiscal years 1692-93 
through 1699-1700. 
It shows that the province by 1770 had borrowed a net sum of £90,650, merely 
3.3 percent of gross expenditures. At times, earlier in the century, the situation 
was far more serious, but there was never a chronic state of public indebtedness 
as many contemporaries believed. It is not the size of public debt that matters, 
rather it is the ability to meet payment; and Massachusetts never at any time lacked 
this ability. She merely employed on occasion before 1749 a variety of expedients, 
some of them unwise, to mitigate her situation. 
To illustrate the situation in which Massachusetts found itself, comparison is made 
with England during years of war. 
Table 7 
War years 
1702-13 
1739-48 
1756-63 
War Expenditure and Public Borrowing in England 
and Massachusetts, 1702-1763 (Thousand£ sterling) 
A B c 
Expenditure Revenue Balance 
England Mass. England Mass. England Mass. 
£ £ £ £ £ £ 
93,645 283 64,239 157 (29,406) (126) 
95,628 471 65,904 206 (29,724) (265) 
160,573 1,015 100,555 709 (60,018) (306) 
(C +A) 
Borrowing 
England Mass. 
£ £ 
31.4 44.5 
31.1 56.3 
37.4 30.1 
Sources: for England, T.G.M. DICKSON, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development 
of Public Credit, 1688-1756 (London: Macmillan, 1967), Table 1, p. 10; for Massachusetts, Massachusetts 
Archives, vol. 122-25; PRO, C05/852-55. 
In absolute terms the sums for which the taxpayers of Massachusetts were responsible 
were naturally far less than for those of England and Wales. If such figures are 
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measured by population, then between Queen Anne's war (1702-13) and the French 
and Indian war (1756-63) the weight of borrowing for Massachusetts fell by one-
third from £2.1 to£ 1.4 per head. For England and Wales, by contrast, borrowing 
rose in the same period by two-thirds from £5.7 to £9.3 per head. Though war 
expenditure rose much more quickly in Massachusetts than in England, her population 
also grew at a much faster rate; thus the aggregated burden was far less heavy at 
mid-century than at the outset. At the same time the colony's ability to meet the 
cost of war from revenue greatly improved over the same period, while England's 
sharply declined. In 1702-13, for instance, as much as 44.3 percent of the war 
budget of Massachusetts came from borrowing, but by 1756-63 this had fallen to 
30 percent. By contrast, the amount of borrowed money applied to war expenditures 
in England rose from 31.4 to almost 40 percent in the same interval. 
It is of interest to see that part of the explanation for the trend in Massachusetts 
arose directly from England's difficulties. Grants from Parliament to Massachusetts 
kept the colony's debt load down, while for England the war of 1756-63 added 
about £4 per head to the National Debt. This sum can be considered a remote cause 
of the American revolution, for misplaced anxiety in England over the growth of 
the National Debt gave rise to the ill-considered parliamentary measures to raise a 
revenue in America in the 1760s. The abrupt change in the direction of British 
colonial policy in 1764 from parliamentary subsidies to parliamentary taxes for the 
American colonies isolated, at least in Massachusetts, the Crown's supporters and 
gave their detractors a popular cause to exploit. It did Thomas Hutchinson, a 
consistent advocate of surplus budgets and specie payments, absolutely no political 
good to boast in January 1774: 
There never has been a time since the first settlement of the country, when the Treasury 
has been in so good a state as it now is. I may congratulate the Province upon its entirely 
being free from debt, the tax of last year, with the stock in the Treasury being equal to 
the securities due from the Government, and to the charges of the current year. 31 
It is ironical that the great transformation in the public finances of Massachusetts, 
which led to the extinction of almost all public debt by 1774, a revolutionary 
phenomenon, occurred as a result of the Louisbourg expedition of 1745. Its capture, 
a matter of great pride, had occasioned enormous medium-term financial strain. 
Taxes were raised to unprecedented heights in the late 1740s, rapid debt expansion 
dwarfed earlier emissions of paper money, inaugurating the great currency inflation. 
Those who made use of the bills of credit suffered losses both of capital and of 
income by employing their assets unproductively. The situation was dramatically 
rescued by the promise in 1748 from Parliament to reimburse the province for its 
expenses at a very favourable exchange rate. In January 1749 the General Court, 
under Hutchinson's leadersliip and after acrimonious debate, decided to employ the 
silver, when it reached Boston, to redeem as much as possible of the paper money, 
and to raise an especially heavy peacetime tax to get hold of the rest. It also banned 
the circulation in Massachusetts of the paper money of its neighbours. Any new 
issues of bills of credit would be revalued at the par of exchange established in 
the 1670s (M£133.33 = £100). 
31. Joseph B. FELT, Historical Account of Massachusetts Currency (Boston, 1839, New York: 
Burt Franklin, 1968), p. 161. 
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By May 1752 the last reference to the old bills of credit was recorded in the 
treasurer's ledgers, and the redemption was at an end. 32 Still there was a shortage 
of silver specie in the treasury; and to meet this problem the General Court hit 
upon the plan of borrowing from its taxpayers, with the promise not only of regular 
interest payments of six percent, the legal maximum, but also the recovery of the 
principal within a stated interval. This reversed the largely unsuccessful policy of 
meeting the government's requirements either by issuing bills of credit in advance 
of collecting taxes, or by lending money to taxpayers. Instead the treasurer issued 
promissory notes, known as certificates, 33 which after initial public hesitation were 
rapidly taken up from 1750 onwards and became part of the colony's money stock. 
Unlike earlier issues they were redeemed punctually and bore a direct relation to 
the public expenditure needs. They did not depreciate, but fluctuated in value as 
compared to sterling between 1750 and 1770, fetching never less than M£45 .08 
and never more than £126.31. In most months for which evidence exists in commercial 
and public transactions they were exchanged at par (M£133.33 = £100). Such 
remarkable stability stood in contrast to the earlier weakness between 1711 and 
1749. 
Such comparatively minor fluctuations in the exchange rate accurately reflected 
the amount of silver and gold coin available in the province, as determined by a 
balance of payments which had moved in favour of Massachusetts. This resulted 
especially from the gains made by merchants supplying the needs of the British 
army and navy in America. A certain indication of this is the amount of coin 
retained in the hands of the treasurer at the end of each fiscal year. Such amounts 
were first mentioned in May 1742, and appear thereafter regularly. Before 1760 
they rarely ranged above £2,500. But owing to parliamentary grants they averaged 
almost £25,000 a year in the 1760s, and in May 1765 actually amounted to almost 
£53,000 in silver coin. 
v 
War between 1~88 and 1713 and again between 1739 and 1763 made high 
public expenditure inevitable in Massachusetts. With it came high taxation and the 
need for financial innovation. No American colony spent more on war than did 
Massachusetts. Such an effort increased the power of the provincial government 
over the towns, yet underscored both the military and naval weakness of Massachusetts 
and her dependence on the might of Britain. Successive provincial administrations 
pursued an expensive imperial policy, sometimes seizing the initiative against the 
French, sometimes falling in with the strategy designed either in London or by 
commanders in chief of the British army in America. In 1763, with the French in 
Canada vanquished, Massachusetts' political leadership was undone by British 
imperial policies. By contrast with those pursued earlier, these seemed to serve no 
32. From the late 1730s until 1752 the treasurer, William Foye, had to keep as many as four 
columns to register entries in his ledgers for each of the Massachusetts currencies simultaneously 
accepted, despite their different values, as legal tenure for tax purposes. 
33. Details of the annual emissions of treasurer's certificates are found in BROCK, Currency, 
p. 596. 
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Massachusetts interest. 34 Royal officials lost their authority in the 1760s in Mas-
sachusetts to those who hitherto had had little political experience, no enduring 
affection for the Crown, but who became confident in 1775 that if necessary the 
province could be organized for independence just as earlier it had been fashioned 
for war with France. 
As the government of Massachusetts changed hands in the 1760s its fiscal 
policy remained one of high taxes and a restricted money supply. By 1774 the debt 
load had almost vanished. Had the Assembly, whether in the hands of the crown 
officials or their critics, beggared the people while enriching the treasury? There 
is no convincing evidence of this. Rather the high levels of taxation, typical of the 
period 1743-50, 1755-74, demonstrated taxpayers' increasing ability to pay the 
costs of governinent at a realistic level for the first time perhaps since Queen Anne's 
war. Even at their highest points after 1743 the per capita burdens never approached 
that of the first decade of the eighteenth century. The difference between the post-
war period after 1713 and the interval after 17 63 was that in the earlier period there 
was no consistent determination by successive administrations to pay off debts 
incurred in wartime. Instead in the earlier period the debt increased significantly. 
By contrast, after 1763, the per capita peacetime costs of government were scaled 
down to a realistic level approximating that of 1713-39. With the blessings of a 
generally buoyant economy, despite occasional credit crises and non-importation 
embargoes, successive administrations were able to pay off the debt contracted in 
wartime. Owing largely to parliamentary grants to help the Massachusett's war 
effort, the per capita debt load after 1763 was much less than it had been after 
1713. Such grants enabled the government of Massachusetts to raise less taxes 
while putting more men under arms than otherwise would have been possible. 
This led in part to the curious political history of the colony in the world after 
1763. It has been said that there is almost nothing as useful as a large mortgage to 
hold either a family or parish together over an extended period of time. The need 
to focus an inordinate amount of energy on ways to handle debt tends to diminish 
factionalism. It is thus ironical that at the very moment in her history that Massachusetts 
produced a series of surplus budgets, to loose the fetters in which her wartime debt 
load had held her, she gave herself over enthusiastically to a revolutionary political 
movement. When it came to armed rebellion, the patriots called upon the people 
to pay their taxes, not to their duly elected provincial treasurer, Harrison Gray, 
whom they falsely accused of having misappropriated large sums of money, but to 
their own state treasurer. 35 When the people chose instead to pay taxes to neither 
34. Pencak agrees, but adds : ''When Britain ... began to seek a more rational mode of imperial 
administration at the end of the 'Great War for Empire' it mistakenly concentrated on the colony that 
had invested the most, both financially and psychologically, in the war .. .. [P]ostwar depression and 
imperial regulation interacted with each other to provoke the fiercest revolutionary movement on the 
continent." War, Politics and Revolution, p. 237. 
35. Gray, elected annually as treasurer since 1753, had not endeared himself to the patriots 
by unhelpfully describing the Boston Tea Party as "an action of such a malignant, atrocious nature, as 
must expose the wicked perpetrators of it, with sincere repentence, to the vengeance of ... God." 
Quoted in Lawrence C. MAYO, "The Spirit of Massachusetts (1775)", in Commonwealth History of 
Massachusetts , ed. Albert Bushnell HALL (New York: The States History, Co. , 1927-30) , 2 : 536. A 
member of Council from 1761, he employed his son as deputy treasurer for thirteen years . As a loyalist 
he received an annual pension of £200 while abroad in London and £2,037 compensation. PRO, 
AOI2/105, fol. 128; A012/109. 
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gentleman, the patriot leaders, fearful of forfeiting their newly won popularity, 
chose not to collect any taxes whatsoever. Until 1778, to finance their war, they 
contended themselves with the former process of printing paper money. 36 Thus in 
Massachusetts, as elsewhere in revolutionary America, the advocates of hard currency 
and fiscal orthodoxy lost all the battles that mattered, while those representing fiscal 
innovation (some called it insanity) and its depreciating paper money, won. In the 
eighteenth century it proved to be the only way to finance popular wars of revolution . 
36. For a summary of the tax system of Massachusetts from 1778 to 1783, see BECKER, 
Revolution, pp. 118-28. 
